Teraethyl Lead and Biopurification

Teraethyl Lead (TEL)-

· TEL is an organolead compound(chemical compounds containing a chemical bond between carbon and lead). It is a toxic colorless synthetically made oily liquid and was mixed with leaded petrol in 1920s as a patented octane booster/ anti-knocking agent that allowed engine compression to be raised substantially, which helped in increasing vehicle performance or fuel economy.
· But its negative impact related to neurotoxicity (lead poisoning), damaging effect on catalytic converters and were main cause for spark plug fouling which lead to start of its phase out in 1970s
· Currently, it is still used as an additive in some grades of aviation gasoline and in some developing countries

Biopurification:
· It is the natural process of exclusion of harmful elements from human body (to maintain optimum level) that has evolved through millions of years of human evolution.
· For example: Calcium and Barium are found in tandem. While calcium is useful for us, barium is poisonous. Our body has evolved in such a way that it produces protein that effectively absorbs calcium while being almost ineffective for Barium
· According to concept of biopurification, natural concentration of harmful elements in human body should be far lower than toxic levels
· This concept of biopurification was first conceptualized by Clair patterson, a geochemist in trying to nullify Robert Kehoe's (medical scientist) claim for higher toxic natural level of lead in human body.

The recent publication of Chinese defense papers clear the air on a variety of issues, including the direction the Chinese military is planning to take. It sets out a broad framework within which expansion will take place, with a few defined focus areas. These areas are forays into high seas and overseas interests-including energy security.

A case for an Indian white paper on foreign policy may be built as follows:

1. A white paper lays down an integrated approach to foreign policy, with all variables being put in the balance. It can serve as a document which translates into actions. A foreign policy will define actions, and not actions foreign policy.

2. A piecemeal approach to foreign policy may be avoided. Rather than shaping the very basics of a particular policy over years in joint communiques and conferences (as happened with Look East Policy, now Act East policy after it remained stale for long); it is desirable to put in place a comprehensive plan.

3. A white paper also assure predictability and continuity in foreign policy. In the international arena, it is important to be consistent. The recent breakdown of talks with Pakistan over Hurriyat leaders is an example of break in foreign policy. (Or include Indian vote on Sri Lanka in UNHRC)

4. A white paper will help cover all aspects which have hitherto been on the backburner or neglected: for example, India's policy on the middle east. Rather than ad-hocism, a well thought out approach is required.

5. Lastly, a white paper will assimilate the tenets of Indian foreign policy at one place, listing down its successes and failures-or reasons for its shift, as also future strategies.

With the Indian phenomenon growing larger on the international scene, it is important that India is seen as a country with a broad plan on how to deal with emerging geopolitics in the future, rather than a nation that decides foreign policy at whim.

मैं क्या जानूँ रोज़ा है, या मेरा रोज़ा टूट गया / मुनव्वर राना

समझौतों की भीड़-भाड़ में, सबसे रिश्ता टूट गया
इतने घुटने टेके हमने, आख़िर घुटना टूट गया

देख शिकारी तेरे कारण, एक परिन्दा टूट गया,
पत्थर का तो कुछ नहीं बिगड़ा, लेकिन शीशा टूट गया

घर का बोझ उठाने वाले, बचपन की तक़दीर न पूछ
बच्चा घर से काम पे निकला, और खिलौना टूट गया

किसको फ़ुर्सत इस दुनिया में, ग़म की कहानी पढ़ने की
सूनी कलाई देख के लेकिन, चूड़ी वाला टूट गया

ये मंज़र भी देखे हमने, इस दुनिया के मेले में
टूटा-फूटा नाच रहा है, अच्छा ख़ासा टूट गया

पेट की ख़ातिर फ़ुटपाथों पर बेच रहा हूँ तस्वीरें
मैं क्या जानूँ रोज़ा है, या मेरा रोज़ा टूट गया

मुनव्वर राना

A repeat of Emergency?

L K Advani's comments on the chances of the country having to re-live the nightmare of Indira Gandhi's Emergency rule of 1975-77 have been viewed in the immediate political context, sparking speculation on whether they were intended as a comment on the prime minister. Mr Advani has clarified that such was not his intent, although he has made some other barbed comments that are more obviously a comment on Narendra Modi. But who Mr Advani's target may or may not be is merely the stuff of everyday politics; what is important is the substance of his comment, and the systemic question of whether the hijacking of the Constitution that happened during 1975-77 is possible in contemporary India.

In important ways, a repeat of that nightmare of 40 years ago - brought to life most recently by Coomi Kapoor's book on that period - is unlikely for the simple reason that one person and one party do not dominate the political landscape the way Indira Gandhi and the Congress did in the 1970s. She had a two-thirds majority in Parliament and control of almost all state governments. Today, the Bharatiya Janata Party has a bare majority in the Lok Sabha and none in the Rajya Sabha. A two-thirds majority for a ruling combine in the Rajya Sabha is unlikely in most scenarios for the future. No one party can, therefore, ram through controversial legislation, let alone any amendment to the Constitution.

Second, no one party controls all state governments; the two leading national parties and a variety of state parties do that. Therefore, arresting all and sundry and gagging the media is not possible in the manner done in June 1975 (since police is a state subject). A putative dictator could, of course, dismiss all inconvenient state governments, but the Supreme Court has struck down such arbitrary action in the past. Meanwhile, the birth of the internet and the popularity of social media make complete clampdown on information flow next to impossible - without which a dictatorship would find it hard to control events. Finally, the Supreme Court had been packed in the 1970s - three judges were superseded to select a pliant chief justice. A repeat exercise is inconceivable when formal processes are being set in place for the selection of judges. None of this makes a repeat Emergency impossible; what it does is more or less rule it out for the foreseeable future.

Other institutional safeguards may be less than effective, like the National Human Rights Commissionand the Press Council. The mainstream press has made its compromises for a variety of reasons, but the secondary press (especially in the digital space) is a growing force. Civil society is stronger, too. The greatest weakness, though, lies in the culture of sycophancy that has spread in one-person or one-family dominant political parties, including at state level. Party bosses acting as though they are above the law is, therefore, not the rare event one would want it to be.

The question to ask, though, is whether you need an Emergency to impinge on human rights and civil liberties. The country may not have one-person or one-party rule, but the essence of a democracy has been getting diluted. Those with criminal histories are routinely nominated by the leading parties and elected to legislatures; can you really expect them to be great upholders of the law? Muslim representation in the Lok Sabha is at a multi-decade low, so its representativeness has suffered. The room for dissenting voices has shrunk, given the expanded definition of what is considered unacceptable in the worlds of the arts and literature. Corruption is not unknown in the lower courts. A journalist who took on a minister was burnt to death the other day. Non-governmental organisations are being squeezed on funding, and the home ministry has actually sought to take away the broadcasting rights of a large media organisation - fortunately, the attorney general has said this would be illegal. Women's freedoms are under attack from traditionalist male forces. The police force remains unreformed. There are many ways in which the institutional protection of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms can be buttressed. It is a task that awaits attention.

http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/a-repeat-of-emergency-it-s-not-likely-115062100902_1.html

Swachh Bharat Abhiyan: Analysis

Swachh Bharat Abhiyan or the Clean India Mission as the name suggests aims to ensure holistic cleanliness in the country by the year 2019. However, the thrust of the mission is on ensuring access to toilets and proper sanitation to all the people. While launched with great fanfare, the mission has been facing challenges of implementation -

1. The focus of the sanitation component is completely infrastructure based i.e., on building toilets. It does not involve the community or plan in a holistic manner for ensuring 'ease of usage' to ensure continued use.

2. While promoting the mission, maximum publicity has been on cleanliness. Hence, an opportunity to publicise the more important sanitation component was lost.

3. While the vision is to have holistic cleanliness, the different components of the mission are being executed by different departments and ministries across the three levels of government. This coupled with the large scale corporate participation makes co-ordination a major challenge.

In order to tackle the problems faced, following steps can be taken -

1. While the expertise of the government lies in ensuring scale (or quantity), the NGOs and private sector partners can ensure quality. Hence, the programme must leverage the strengths of both sectors.

2. A decentralised approach must be followed based on the subsidiarity principle to ensure sustainable change.

3. Focus must be on changing behaviour and mindsets instead of creating infrastructure.

There have been many schemes, programmes and mission focusing on cleanliness and sanitation. To ensure that this mission be the last of any such scheme, the government must ensure that the focus remains on changing mindsets rather than creating infrastructure. Only then will be be able to achieve a 'Swach Bharat.'

मीर तक़ी 'मीर'

अश्क आंखों में कब नहीं आता
लहू आता है जब नहीं आता।

होश जाता नहीं रहा लेकिन
जब वो आता है तब नहीं आता।

दिल से रुखसत हुई कोई ख्वाहिश
गिरिया कुछ बे-सबब नहीं आता।

इश्क का हौसला है शर्त वरना
बात का किस को ढब नहीं आता।

जी में क्या-क्या है अपने ऐ हमदम
हर सुखन ता बा-लब नहीं आता।

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कोफ़्त से जान लब पर आई है
हम ने क्या चोट दिल पे खाई है


लिखते रुक़ा, लिख गए दफ़्तर
शौक़ ने बात क्या बड़ाई है


दीदनी है शिकस्गी दिल की
क्या इमारत ग़मों ने ढाई है


है तसन्ना के लाल हैं वो लब
यानि इक बात सी बबाई है


दिल से नज़दीक और इतना दूर
किस से उसको कुछ आश्नाई है


जिस मर्ज़ में के जान जाती है
दिलबरों ही की वो जुदाई है


याँ हुए ख़ाक से बराबर हम
वाँ वही नाज़-ए-ख़ुदनुमाई है


मर्ग-ए-मजनूँ पे अक़्ल गुम है 'मीर'
क्या दीवाने ने मौत पाई है

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गुल ब बुलबुल बहार में देखा
एक तुझको हज़ार में देखा

जल गया दिल सफ़ेद हैं आखें
यह तो कुछ इंतज़ार में देखा

आबले का भी होना दामनगीर
तेरे कूचे के खार में देखा

जिन बालाओं को 'मीर' सुनते थे
उनको इस रोज़गार में देखा 

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दिखाई दिये यूं कि बेख़ुद किया
हमें आप से भी जुदा कर चले

जबीं सजदा करते ही करते गई
हक़-ए-बन्दगी हम अदा कर चले

परस्तिश की यां तक कि अय बुत तुझे
नज़र में सभों की ख़ुदा कर चले

बहुत आरज़ू थी गली की तेरी
सो यां से लहू में नहा कर चले 

The problem faced by government in the defence sector

The problem faced by government in the defence sector can be summarized as below :-
1. The woes of the DRDO:
--the research and manufacturing capabilities of the DRDO are embarrassingly poor .
-- saddled by the problem of utterly slow bureaucracy and inordinate delays in decision making and progress of critical defence research programmes .
-- it is facing huge shortage of skilled manpower and infrastructure such as advance labs .
2.Slow and un-moving acquisition process : the defence acquistion process of critical millitary hardware has been
--distressingly slow and unresponsive to the need of the time ,locked motionless at the bureaucratic level in the defence ministry,worsened further by delayed supply of ordered military equipment and escalating costs than estimated before .
--no proper structure in India’s acquisition hierarchy that ‘owns’ the acquisition process.There are gaps in targets, responsibility and accountability.
3.the diplomatic efforts so far have been unable to persuade countries like the U.S to share and sell their cutting -edge technology.The upper cap of 49% in FDI in defence sector has been unable to generate sufficient enthusiasm and interest among major foreign defence players to share their technological knowhow .
4.lack of properly framed defence policy and likely hurdles in acquisition of land for defence purposes further complicates the problem.
Steps that needs to be taken:-
a)focusing more on indigenous defence technology development by appropriate funding of researches and hiring skilled manpower by DRDO and other state and private owned entities in defence .
b) the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has to be urgently revamped to cut the bureaucratic steps to a bare minimum.
c)India’s acquisition process must become the enabler of an indigenous defence manufacturing base that delivers on quality, timeliness and capacity.
d)creating a structure that owns the acquisition process and has officers of all departments influencing defence indigenisation and must work under one head, who will oversee the process of drafting policy and implementation.

Increasing the number of work entitlement days from 100 to 150 in drought-hit districts

Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is a scheme through which the government has tried to provide an alternate means of employment to the rural poor and thus alleviate rural distress due to under- or unemployment.
Increasing the number of work entitlement days from 100 to 150 in drought-hit districts would have the following effects -
1. Such a move would be a short-term measure and ensure that distress due to failed crops does not create insurmountable problems for the rural poor.
2. It would ensure that the people can fulfill their basic needs and do not resort to forced migration in search of jobs elsewhere.
3. However, just increasing the entitlement days is not the solution. The government needs to also ensure that work is generated to meet that entitlement. The average work provided was only 40 days in 2014-15.
4. The government must also focus on such works which will help to alleviate the problems faced by the people in the long term, thus the focus must be on water conservation efforts, and durable infrastructure for the villages.
5. The government must also ensure that the issue of delays in payments and leakages are also tackled. Given the vast coverage by the government under the Jan Dhan and Aadhar schemes, achieving this task should become progressively easier.
However, increasing the entitlement under MGNREGA should only be treated as a temporary measure, the government must also take steps for long term solutions -
1. Promotion of crop insurance schemes to ensure that the government to transfer some of the risk of a disaster from the government's balance sheets.
2. Development of disaster management plan with well defined 'trigger points'. This would ensure that any future such calamity will be speedily tackled.
3. Generation of well paying jobs in the manufacturing sector to reduce the pressure on agriculture.
Thus, while increasing the entitlements would have a positive impact in the short run, the government must also keep focus on ensuring the mitigation of the problem in the long run

Krishi Vigyan Kendras

Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVKs) are the frontline agricultural extension center funded by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR). The KVKs focus on training and education of farmers, rural youth, on field demonstration of new and improved farming techniques etc.
It was felt that the Indian Farmers do not have knowledge about scientific farming methods, the soil-crop linkages, fertilizer requirements etc. Hence, KVKs were set up to ensure a last mile linkage, which would provide farmers with information and training about scientific farming, mitigation measures in case of adverse climatic events, consultancy services regarding the type of crops to be sown, the type and amount of fertilizer to be used etc.
However the KVKs have not had the impact that was envisioned.
1. KVKs have different organisational structures. While some come directly under ICAR, others are monitored by State Agricultural Universities or even Civil Society Organisations. This has led to problems of monitoring and co-ordination problems.
2. While the KVKs have had some impact by proving training and some advisory services, their mandate was very expansive which they have not been able to fulfill due to lack of budgetary support.
3. One KVK has been established in every district in the country. However, a district could be very large (Upto 38000 sq kms). Hence, one KVK has not been enough to cover the entire district. Thus, the impact on KVKs has been only in the immediate surrounding areas.
4. The KVKs do not have integration with the weather monitoring and forecasting services. This impacts their ability to advise farmers about the mitigating steps in case of adverse climate.
While KVKs have had some impact, there is potential to do a lot more. The government must look at reviewing the locations of KVKs, meet the manpower requirements and also consider setting up more than one KVK in a district. KVKs are essential in order to reach the goal of at least 4% growth in agriculture. They must be empowered to help proactively in achieving that target.

Street Vendors Act, 2014

By enacting the Street Vendors Act, 2014, the government aimed to balance three key objectives - Protecting the livelihoods of the vendors, ensuring congestion free public spaces and streets and ensuring the convenience of vending services for the consumers. However while the intention was good, it has not translated on ground -
1. The Act aims at ensuring a uniform legal framework to protect the livelihood of street vendors. However, it leaves major areas of regulation to the street vending scheme to be formulated by the state governments and implemented by the local authorities.
2. Formation of the Town Vending Committee with at least 40% representation of street vendors, one third of whom are women is a good step. However, in the creation of the street vending plan or in dispute redressal mechanism, the TVC has no role whatsoever. The national policy on Urban Street Vending, 2009 required that TVCs be consulted while deciding the vending zones.
3. The role of TVCs has been reduced to specifying time limits for issue and renewal of registration and vending certificate. And to store data regarding street vendors like category of vending, stall allotted etc. Since this law supercedes the laws enacted by states like Rajasthan and Gujarat which provided significant powers to the TVCs, it is actually a step backwards.
4. The act specifies that no vendor can be evicted without a 7 day notice by the local authority. Also the vendor will be entitled to a separate vending location. This provision has however been observed only in its breach with vendors being evicted at will based on the whims and fancies of police and local authorities.
While the intentions and the provisions of the law are good, it has not had a material impact on the lives of the vendors themselves. Enacting good laws is not the solution to any problem. It is only the first step. What is more important is how it is implemented. Now that the first step has been taken, the government must ensure that its implementation is in step with the spirit of the law to ensure that the objectives behind its enactment are met.